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Access to U.S. Federal Courts as a Forum for
Human Rights Disputes:
Pluralism and the Alien Tort Claims Act
CHRISTIANA OCHOA*
INTRODUCTION
The contribution of this paper to the conference falls under the category of
The United States Experience of the Pluralistic Deficit Before the Courts. Rather
than discuss the inclusion of U.S. citizens in the judicial process or the U.S. do-
mestic judicial system per se, this paper will address pluralism in the context of
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA or the Act)' portion of Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,2 which at the time of this conference was being decided by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. This paper will first briefly describe how the
ATCA, and the opposition it has faced, reflects and informs the U.S. position on
civic pluralism on an international level, or rather, civic participation by people
other than U.S. citizens. Second, the ATCA requires federal courts to incorpo-
rate international human rights and humanitarian law into the analysis of cases
brought before them on ATCA grounds.3 These acts of incorporating law, legal
opinions, and jurisprudence from sources other than U.S. state or federal law
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; J.D., Harvard
Law School; B.A., University of Michigan. The author would like to thank the Faculty of Law at
the University of Trento for hosting the conference at which this paper was first presented, as well
as Dean Robert Toniatti, Fulvio Cortese, Marco Dani, and Francesco Palermo for their invitation
to participate therein. In addition, she would like to express sincere gratitude to Timothy Lynch,
Alfred Aman, Luisa Antoniolli, Elisabeth Zoller, David Williams, Susan Williams, Luis Fuentes-
Rowher, and William Henderson for their insightful comments at various stages of this article's
completion. Thanks also to the editors of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, especially
Carmen Brun and Wayne Branom Ill.
1. The current text of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA or Act) is published as 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (2005). There have been minor alterations to the statutory language of the ATCA since its
original drafting in 1789.
2. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was argued on March 30, 2004 and decided on June 29, 2004. See
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
3. See Alien Tort Claims Act.
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can be framed as acts of legal pluralism.4 This paper will therefore propose that
courts ought to consider the robust history and tradition of instances of legal plu-
ralism as a means for allowing customary international human rights law to
enter our own decisionmaking process and thereby add routes for civic partici-
pation available to victims of human rights abuses.
Part I, therefore, will provide a brief historical and contextual background
to the ATCA and the litigation that has occurred under it, as well as some of the
arguments advanced by those who oppose the Act. Because the decision in Sosa
now frames the ongoing debates and litigation in which the ATCA is featured,
Part II will summarize the holding in that case. Part III will describe the Act's
contributions to increased civic pluralism in order to suggest that the very con-
cept of pluralism-both in terms of civic pluralism and legal pluralism-is at
the core of the opposition to the ATCA. Part IV will then propose that, in the
case of the ATCA, legal pluralism and civic pluralism are necessarily intercon-
nected. Ultimately, this paper will argue that the increased civic pluralism that
the Act provides relies on a willingness to incorporate ideas and methodology
from legal pluralism.
I. HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AND OPPOSITION
TO THE ACT
In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit announced its de-
cision in Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala.5 The appellants in the case, also the plaintiffs be-
fore the trial court, were Paraguayan nationals who sought to convince the
Second Circuit that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over a case involv-
ing a tort committed in Paraguay by the defendant-appellee who was also a
Paraguayan national.6 According to the Filfrtigas, during the time Mr. Pefia was
the Inspector General of Police in Asunci6n, Paraguay, Mr. Pefia kidnapped,
tortured, and killed the Filirtigas' son and brother, Joelito Filirtiga.7 The plain-
tiffs' alleged violations of "wrongful death statutes; the U.N. Charter; the Uni-
versal Declaration on Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration Against Torture;
4. See generally THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (Neelan Tiruchelvam &
Radhika Coomaraswamy eds., 1987) (various authors describing the use of multiple sources of law
in the judiciaries of different countries).
5. Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. Id. at 878, 880.
7. Id. at 878.
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the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent
declarations, documents, and practices constituting the customary international
law of human rights and the law of nations."8 The plaintiffs relied on these doc-
uments as evidence of customary international law prohibiting the treatment to
which Joelito Filirtiga was subjected. In so doing, they hoped to show that the
requirements for liability under the ATCA had been satisfied.9 The ATCA pro-
vides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."'" The Second Circuit decided in Fildrtiga that the ATCA
"validly creates federal court jurisdiction for suits alleging torts committed any-
where in the world against aliens in violation of the law of nations.""
Passed by the First Congress in 1789, the ATCA was rarely invoked until
the Second Circuit breathed life into it through its decision in Fildrtiga.2 In the
nearly twenty-five years since, it has been at the center of a lively controversy
over the use of the federal court system as a forum for settling the grievances of
foreign nationals. 3
Over the course of a quarter century, there have emerged what might ap-
pear to be three types of cases brought under this statute. The first, of which
Fildrtiga and Kadic v. Karadzic4 are the best-known and perhaps the most em-
blematic, is characterized by foreign plaintiffs bringing suit against foreign de-
fendants. In both cases, the plaintiffs found their defendant in the United States
and were able to serve process on that defendant. Their suits included allega-
tions that the defendants, acting under color of law, engaged in tortious viola-
tions of international law. These cases involved violations of a select subset of
enumerated human rights so grave as to be indisputably prohibited by custom-
ary international law and included kidnappings, torture, killings, and violations
8. Id. at 879.
9. Id.
10. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2005).
11. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing Fildrtiga, 630 F2d at 876).
12. Three cases invoked the ATCA prior to Fildrtiga. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F Supp. 857, 859 (D.
Md. 1961); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942,947-48 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895); Bolchos v. Darrel,
3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.C.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). See also Brief for the United States as Respondent
Supporting Petitioner at 17 n.1, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339).
13. The ATCA is central to this debate, particularly as it pertains to accountability for human
rights and humanitarian law violations. There are other areas of law cited in this debate, includ-
ing the long-arm aspects of federal antitrust statutes.
14. Kadic, 70 F3d at 236-37.
CHRISTIANA OCHOA
of the laws of war.15 This type of ATCA case did not require the courts to apply
international human rights norms to individuals acting in a private capacity, a
practice about which there continues to be significant disagreement and confu-
sion. 6 Rather, these cases applied international law against state actors or defen-
dants acting under color of state law. 7 Nonetheless, the opinions published in
these cases set the groundwork for cases to be litigated against private actors.
The Karadzic case is probably best thought of as facilitating the transition be-
tween the first generation of cases-cases against individuals acting under color of
state law-and the second generation, which has involved private actors as defen-
dants. Among the questions in Karadzic was whether Radovan Karadzic was a
state actor." He was the leader of the Bosnian-Serb faction at the time he perpe-
trated the violations at issue, but this meant he was the leader of an unrecognized
government.'9 According to the district court, this meant he was a private actor,
and therefore, could not be held liable for violations of human rights." The appel-
late court reversed this decision. It found two separate circumstances under which
a private actor could bear international obligations. The first was when the individ-
ual commits one of a narrow set of wrongs that are of such gravity that state action
is not considered a requisite for responsibility-for example in the case of genocide.
The second was when the violations were sufficiently tied to state action as to bring
international standards to bear. In Karadzic's case, the court found that the signif-
icant support he received from the Yugoslav government tied his acts to the legiti-
mate Yugoslav government, and thereby gave his conduct the color of law.
21
15. See id.; Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
16. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1996).
17. The Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. Karadzic addresses this issue directly. Karadzic
was the leader of the "self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of 'Srpska."' See Kadic, 70 F3d at
236. The court discussed in dicta that the application of certain aspects of international law need
not be limited to states or state actors, but preferred to characterize Karadzic as a state actor rather
than as a private individual because he was acting under color of law owing to his collaboration
with the former Yugoslavia or with substantial Yugoslavian aid. Id. at 245. But see Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J. concurring), cert. denied.,
470 U.S. 1003 (1985). Judge Edwards stated that the application of international law to private ac-
tors is limited in this way: "Specifically, I do not believe the law of nations imposes the same re-
sponsibility or liability on non-state actors, such as the PLO, as it does on states and persons acting
under color of state law."
18. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.
19. Id. at 236.
20. Id. at 237.
21. Id. at 245.
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During the era in which ATCA cases were limited to this type of litigation-
when ATCA cases featured state actors committing violations of the most indis-
putably protected human rights-there was little opposition to the statute. At that
time, the U.S. Department of State issued advisory letters to the courts hearing
these cases, which encouraged them not only to hear the cases, but to feel at liberty
to find the defendants liable for whatever violations they were found to have
committed.
22
Still, the recognition in the Karadzic case that private actors could bear re-
sponsibility for human rights violations under the ATCA cleared the path to the
second type of ATCA claims and has brought the ATCA international renown.
This set of ATCA cases is characterized by foreign plaintiffs' instituting actions
against a range of private actors, including corporations of various national ori-
gins, for violations of international law based on human rights and environmen-
tal claims. The prototypical corporate responsibility cases of this generation are
those against large oil and gas multinationals in the extraction business in
increasingly remote regions of the world. Famous examples include: a case
brought against Royal Dutch/Shell Oil charging the defendants with complicity
in human rights violations in Nigeria, particularly the killing of Ken Saro-
Wiwa and others who were protesting a pipeline that was being laid by the com-
pany;23 the Aguinda v. Texaco litigation, in which indigenous people living in a
relatively untrammeled region of Ecuador brought an action against Texaco for
multiple violations of rights recognized by international human rights treaties; 24
and a case initiated by Burmese peasants alleging that Unocal was complicit in
the violation of various human rights norms, including forced relocation, tor-
ture, rape, and murder committed by the Burmese military while providing se-
curity for the construction of a Unocal pipeline. 25
Given the increasing success the second generation of cases has had before
federal courts (albeit success on procedural questions), opposition from predict-
22. See Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Filfrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), available at httpi/
www.cja.org/legalResources/FilartigaUSMemo.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005); Kadic, 70 F3d at
51.
23. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 2002).
24. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002).
25. Roe v. Unocal Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
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able sources has mounted. The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) is at
the head of this opposition.26 They have argued in multiple amicus briefs that the
ATCA harms the U.S. economy by placing companies, especially U.S. compa-
nies or those with a presence in the United States, at significant risk of being
sued by plaintiffs invoking "a bewildering variety of international law rights."
27
This risk and uncertainty, the NFTC argues, creates higher costs in planning, fi-
nancing, and insuring corporate overseas activities. 28 Companies with a presence
in the United States have, in fact, been subjected to liability under the ATCA
from which foreign companies have been able to escape owing to a lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction over some foreign defendants. 29 The NFTC argues that the
consequences of additional exposure for companies with a U.S. presence are
grave for the U.S. economy.3
0
The third type of ATCA cases has only recently started to emerge and is char-
acterized by individuals who act in concert with the U.S. government appearing
as its defendants. One such case was Papa v. United States, in which family mem-
bers of a Brazilian national sued 100 John Does, the U.S. government, and the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) when their husband and father, a
Brazilian national, was apprehended by the INS and killed by other detainees
while he was in INS custody.3 Another example is the case that now frames the
continued life and utility of the ATCA: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
32
This new generation of cases has spawned a new generation of opponents as
well. Among them is the executive branch of the U.S. government, often speak-
ing through the State Department that once endorsed litigation under the
ATCA33 or, alternatively, through the Justice Department.34
26. The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) describes itself as "the premier business orga-
nization advocating a rules-based world economy." Brief for the NFTC, USA*Engage, the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
and the United States Council for International Business as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 1, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339) [hereinafter Brief for NFTC].
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id. at 12.
29. See, e.g., Roe, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
30. Brief for NFTC, supra note 26, at 12 n.18.
31. Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002).
32. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). This case is described in greater detail in
Part III of this paper.
33. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, at 3.
34. The United States has submitted briefs as amicus curiae in a number of cases. See, e.g., id.
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The primary argument being advanced by the executive branch is that the
ATCA will have a potentially serious adverse impact in the war against terrorist
organizations. The brief for the United States35 and the brief filed by Sosa s6 both
argued that, if the Supreme Court were to allow the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the ATCA, it would not be limited to addressing suits against "rogues
and outlaws."37 Instead, it would have the capacity to cause governments and in-
dividuals that ally themselves with the United States and participate in U.S.
antiterrorism, military, and police actions to be brought to trial.
Although the United States is immune from suit under the ATCA, 8 na-
tions, and individuals, that participate in kidnappings similar to the one at issue
in the Sosa litigation, 39 or the incarcerations at issue in Al Odah v. United States,4"
can be subject to scrutiny and liability under the ATCA.
Opponents of this set of ATCA claims argue that the Act will hinder the
war on terrorism by restricting the types of activities in which U.S. allies will be
willing to engage as part of their efforts to assist the war on terrorism, for fear of
potentially embarrassing and costly litigation. This will also have the effect of al-
lowing for indirect or vicarious judicial review of the executive branch's efforts
to enforce its criminal laws or conduct its military operations, in furtherance of
its antiterrorist objectives. If U.S. courts find a foreign government or foreign
bounty hunter liable for human rights violations committed while acting in con-
cert with the U.S. government, the fight against terrorism could be hobbled and
the U.S. government would face international criticism and embarrassment,
even without a finding of culpability directly against the United States.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ATCA IN Sosa v.
Alvarez -Machain: A "DEMANDING STANDARD OF DEFINITION"
'41
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, the original plaintiff in the Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain litigation, was a Mexican national who was kidnapped in Mexico. His
35. Id. at 17.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 17.
38. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concur-
ring);see also Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, at 19.
39. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, at 17.
40. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1135 (alleging that the military's detention of aliens at the U.S. Naval
Base at GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba, violates the law of nations and U.S. treaties).
41. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2769 n.30 (2004).
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abductors were other Mexican citizens acting on behalf of the U.S. Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA). After his abduction, Mr. Alvarez was transported to
the United States where he was arrested, imprisoned, tried, and acquitted of in-
volvement in the murder of a DEA agent. After returning to his home country, he
sued the Mexican citizens who kidnapped him, including Francisco Sosa, as well
as individual DEA agents, the DEA, and the U.S. government for contracting for
his abduction.42
Following a long history of deliberation in and among the lower federal
courts over the content and meaning of the ATCA, the Supreme Court issued its
first elaboration on its interpretation of the ATCA in its June 2004 Sosa deci-
sion.43 While many supporters of the ATCA feared a decision that would evis-
cerate the ATCA, 44 the Court's opinion left the door ajar (subject to "vigilant
doorkeeping")45 to "independent judicial recognition of actionable international
norms '"46 such that federal courts may continue to take cognizance of and inter-
pret a "narrow class of international norms." Therefore, the ATCA may serve as
a means of redress for those who have suffered violations of that narrow class of
norms.47 In determining whether a particular norm is of the small set plaintiffs
may employ under the ATCA, the Court required that any claim under the law
42. Id. at 2747; Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cit. 2003).
43. The Supreme Court had previously accepted cases containing ATCA questions, but did not
provide the lower courts with interpretive guidance on the Act in those cases. See Rasul v. Bush,
124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (issued just a day before the Sosa decision); Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
44. Among the most readily foreseeable means for nullifying the utility of the ATCA was a strong
argument advanced originally by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner that the ATCA was a jurisdictional
grant only and did not create a private cause of action for violations of customary international law.
Significantly, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Sosa, takes exactly this position. Under this view, unless the
legislature has granted a specific cause of action, whether by self-executing treaty or independent leg-
islative action, the ATCA cannot provide the means for redress for violations of norms recognized in
international law alone. In the concluding paragraph of his concurrence, Justice Scalia states:
American law-the law made by the people's democratically elected representa-
tives-does not recognize a category of activity that is so universally disapproved by
other nations that it is automatically unlawful here, and automatically gives rise to a
private action for money damages in federal court. That simple principle is what to-
day's decision should have announced.
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2776 (Scalia, J., concurring).
45. Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2764.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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of nations "[1] rest on a norm of international character [2] accepted by the civi-
lized world and [3] defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms"48 recognized by the Court. In other words, federal
courts "should not recognize private claims under federal common law for vio-
lations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was
enacted."49 While the first two criteria will surely give rise to future ATCA de-
bate and litigation, it is this third requirement, which is likely to give rise to the
most active continued deliberation.
In an effort to provide some guidance, the Court provided some limitations
on the types of claims that can be entertained by ATCA litigation. Citing to Tel-
Oren50 and In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation,S5 the Court outlines a set
of standards for analyzing any given claim. A norm giving rise to liability under
the ATCA must be (1) specific or definable, (2) universal, and (3) obligatory.52 In
addition, the Court sets out a number of other, case-contingent limitations, such
as exhaustion of domestic remedies 53 and case-specific deference to the political
branches, especially in cases which may have an impact on U.S. foreign policy.
54
Significantly, the Court accepted the argument that, as a general matter, the
ATCA's jurisdictional grant permits federal courts to recognize a limited set of
human rights violations. However, in reviewing the particular facts of Mr.
Alvarez-Machain's detention and his assertions that the violations he suffered
amounted to violations of customary international law such that the ATCA
should grant him relief, the Court applied the above parameters to determine
that Mr. Alvarez-Machain's ATCA claims were without merit:
Whatever may be said for the broad principle Alvarez advances, in
the present, imperfect world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds
any binding customary rule having the specificity we require.... It
48. Id. at 2761.
49. Id. at 2765.
50. 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards J., concurring).
51. 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
52. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765-66 (citing Tel-Oren, 726 E2d at 781; In re Estate of Marcos, 25 E3d at
1475).
53. Id. at 2766 n.21. This principle seems to have guided the Second Circuit's decision in the
Texaco litigation, which has been sent back to Ecuador for resolution under the watchful eye of
the Second Circuit.
54. Id.
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is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day,
followed by a transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so
well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.55
For those who were pessimistic about the ATCA's ability to survive the
Court's purview in the Sosa case, what is clear from the decision issued is that the
ATCA remains a viable statute for foreigners to bring a limited set of claims be-
fore U.S. federal courts. While the Supreme Court's decision has limited the scope
of viable ATCA claims, litigation under the Act will continue. Debate over ac-
ceptable ATCA claims will also continue, and will likely be primarily focused on
the exact meaning of specific or definable, universal, and obligatory norms.
III. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AS A TOOL FOR PLURALISM
The ATCA serves an essential role in the furtherance of pluralism by allow-
ing for greater civic participation. It does so by at least three means:
* The ATCA helps to alleviate the systemic enforcement deficit from which
international law has long suffered.
" The availability of U.S. courts to victims of human rights abuses alleviates
the judicial deficit from which individual victims have long suffered.
* The publicity drawn to the violations suffered by plaintiffs under the
ATCA alleviates a global information deficit. Such publicity leads to in-
creased global cause-centered involvement, or a diminution of the plural-
istic deficit.
This section will discuss each of these means in turn.
A. The ATCA alleviates the systemic enforcement deficit from which international
law has long suffered.
Those working within the human rights system, perhaps more so than within
any other aspect of international law, face "wicked problems,"56 stemming from
55. Id. at 2769.
56. The term "wicked problems" and its approach to problem solving is borrowed from Policy
Sciences to describe problems, which, among other characteristics, do not have a well-described
mmmm
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innumerable and chaotic social, political, economic, and historical circumstances.
It has long been recognized that among the most frustrating aspects of the aspira-
tional human rights system are the limited channels through which victims can
seek adequate redress for their suffering and, as a corollary, the impunity with
which violators can infringe on human rights. 
57
Several forums exist to hear human rights claims, ranging from those avail-
able through the United Nations, to the regional systems for human rights, and
to the newly established International Criminal Court. Still, the number of
human rights abuses committed each day relative to the small number of abuses
these bodies are able to accept and handle is evidence of the lack of sufficient
legal channels to hear these claims. One current example is the flood of human
rights communications received by the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee.58 There are now such high numbers of communications received from
victims that the Committee simply cannot address them all. This is a systemic
problem inherent in the current human rights framework.
Even if the Committee were able to address all the communications it receives
under the current committee protocols, a given victim would never receive more
satisfactory redress than the diplomatically phrased admonitions made by the
Committee against human rights violators. Like many of the human rights
bodies, it has no ability to enter a judgment against a violator or grant compensa-
tion to victims. This is surely a desirable characteristic under some circumstances.
But it is not ideal in all circumstances. The regional systems for human rights pro-
tections are similarly overloaded, and while they are able to grant compensation,
they are not able to do so expeditiously.
By providing access to domestic courts, the ATCA provides a new channel for
the resolution of a limited class of human rights disputes. In 1992, Belgium en-
set of potential solutions. Wicked problems are those for which solutions are very difficult to rec-
ognize. A characteristic of a wicked problem is that in solving a wicked problem, the solution of
one aspect may reveal another, more complex problem. See generally Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin
M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL'Y Sci. 155 (1973) (describing how cur-
rent scientific problem solving solutions cannot deal with social policy "wicked problems") [here-
inafter Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning]. See also Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber,
Planning Problems are Wicked Problems, in DEVELOPMENTS IN DESIGN METHODOLOGY 135 (Nigel
Cross ed., 1984) [hereinafter Planning Problems are Wicked Problems].
57. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILLIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 592-983 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing enforcement of human rights).
58. Ivan Shearer, Member of United Nations Human Rights Committee, Lecture to Human
Rights Seminar, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington (Mar. 2004).
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acted a similar law (which has since been repealed),59 granting universal jurisdic-
tion to Belgian courts in cases involving criminal violations of humanitarian law. 6
59. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights News: Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, at
www.hrw.org/press/2003/08/belgiumO8O103.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
60. In May 2003, a lawsuit was filed in Belgium under its humanitarian law against U.S. Army
General Tommy Franks for violations of the Geneva Conventions. Richard Bernstein, Belgium:
War Crimes Complaint Against Franks, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2003, at A12. Cases were also filed
against former President George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and then-Generals Colin Powell and
Norman Schwarzkopf "for alleged crimes in the first Gulf War." Robert H. Bork, WALL ST. J.,
June 22, 2003 (online editorial). The ATCA bears similarities to universal jurisdiction statutes in
that the primary objective is to ensure that grave violations of human rights do not go unad-
dressed and ensuring that their perpetrators do not enjoy impunity. It is also similar in the types of
avenues the ATCA and universal jurisdiction statutes provide for civic pluralism. The demands
they make on domestic court systems to include international law as part of the domestic legal sys-
tem-increasing legal pluralism-are also similar. However, there are important differences.
The universal jurisdiction statutes are modern statutes. For example, the Belgian Statute was
passed in 1993, amended in 1999 and again in 2003, before being repealed in June 2003. As such,
modern universal jurisdiction statutes are very specific about the international law provisions they
address. The Belgian statute specifically referred to or incorporated the 1949 Geneva Conventions
on war crimes, and their protocols, the Genocide Convention and crimes against humanity, largely
as defined by the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The provisions of international law
which are included in these statutes are undeniably the human rights and humanitarian law provi-
sions about which there is no dispute. They are obligations under treaty law and have also risen to
the status of customary international law and even the small subset of customary law from which
there can be no derogation by individual states-they have the status ofjus cogens.
The language of the ATCA is not so specific or discriminating. It was promulgated in 1789
and simply is not drafted with the same particularity as modern statutes. The Second Circuit de-
cided in Fildrtiga that the ATCA "validly creates federal court jurisdiction for suits alleging torts
committed anywhere in the world against aliens in violation of the law of nations." Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 E3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980)). This was the extent of its specificity when it was revived by the Second Circuit.
The ATCA is also distinct from universal jurisdiction statutes in that universal jurisdiction
statutes are criminal statutes, providing for imprisonment for periods from 10 years to life, or
given the emphasis on the gravity of these crimes and the need to punish them, universal jurisdic-
tion statutes often state that the highest penalty available should be applied. The consequences on
the life and liberty of the defendants, in other words, can be quite grave under universal jurisdic-
tion statutes. In addition to the criminal aspects of universal jurisdiction statutes, defendants may
face civil liabilities as well. As the name of the Alien Tort Claims Act indicates, however, defen-
dants face only civil liabilities in the form of monetary consequences, not criminal sanctions.
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Spain has also enacted a universal jurisdiction criminal statute.6 By means of
hearing cases brought under such statutes, a limited number of domestic courts
have become legitimate, established, and respected locations for the resolution of
some human rights disputes, alleviating one of the most vexing systemic deficits
in international law-the lack of mechanisms for the enforcement of human
rights violations.
Wicked problems require multiple open routes for solutions.62 By their na-
ture, these problems are complex and are not easily resolved by one or two avail-
able mechanisms.63 An exhortation that human rights are fundamental to being
human is powerful. But without adequate means for redress, violations of basic
human rights may lead to widespread discontent, widespread malaise, or violent
solution-seeking. In order to minimize impunity and the attendant popular dis-
enfranchisement it creates, the greatest number of viable routes for legitimately
and equitably resolving human rights violations ought to be made available.
B. The availability of U.S. courts to victims of human rights abuses alleviates the
judicial deficit from which individual victims have long suffered.
Some individuals, who have long been powerless to assert their human rights
and seek redress for violations thereof, are currently able to use U.S. federal courts
as a forum for the airing and resolving of a class of human rights disputes. What
does this mean in practical terms? The Filirtiga family, the first to be awarded a
judgment under the ATCA, was awarded a handsome sum as compensation for
the torture and killing of their father and brother.' The victims in a multitude of
other ATCA cases have also been granted declaratory and monetary relief.65 For
those who are victims of violations of a small subset of well-defined, customary
human rights norms, redress and compensation are available.
61. See Smo FRANCISCO GARCiA P9REZ & Fco. JAVIER G6MEZ DE LIAf O BOTELLA, LEY ORGkNICA
DEL PODER JUDICIAL: DOCUMENTACI6N LECISLATIVA Y JURISPRUDENCIAL, COMENTARIOS (1985) (set-
ting forth the terms of Article 23(4) of Spain's Organic Law of the Judicial Power); Ley orginica,
6/1985, de I de julio, art. 23.4 (a), (b) (Sp.) (permitting criminal jurisdiction even if an offense was
committed outside of Spain, if committed by a foreigner).
62. See Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,supra note 56, at 160-67; Planning Problems are
Wicked Problems, supra note 56, at 135-44.
63. See id.
64. See Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 876. It should be noted, however, that although the Filfrtigas were
awarded a $10 million judgment, no payment was ever made under the judgment.
65. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F3d at 232.
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In all too many instances, domestic courts in the locations where violations
take place are either inadequate to handle the actions brought by victims, are un-
willing to sustain cases they believe will have negative economic consequences
for the country, or are not seen as legitimate by their populations. For example:
Ecuador's judicial system does not even recognize the concept of a
class-action lawsuit and has no history of environmental litigation
whatsoever. (The system is also notoriously corrupt; a poll by
George Washington University found that only 16 percent of
Ecuadoreans have confidence in their judiciary, lower than in any
other Latin American country except Guatemala.)66
By providing a location for suits alleging human rights violations by means of
the ATCA, the United States offers itself as a legitimate and well-established ju-
dicial system-one that is respected globally for its fairness and efficiency-to
some of the world's least protected people. The conditions leading to their becom-
ing victims, including being poor or under-protected within their own domestic
systems, are mitigated when they are given access to protection and compensation
for violations they may experience. In this way, one of the deficits from which they
suffer, access to judicial means of dispute resolution, is alleviated.
This type of individualized judicial empowerment is an alternative to vio-
lence resulting from disenfranchisement. It is perhaps because of avenues avail-
able to those who suffer human rights violations that gatherings such as the
January 2004 meeting of the World Social Forum (WSF) in Mumbai, at which
over 100,000 people from all over the world gathered to discuss anticapitalist sen-
timents, can occur and can conclude without incitements to violence.67 Indeed,
this meeting was imbued with hope and empowerment, such that the slogan of
the WSF reads "Another World is Possible."6 Given their numerical strength,
coupled with their "opposition to a process of globalisation commanded by the
large multinational corporations and by the governments and international insti-
tutions at the service of those corporations' interests, with the complicity of na-
66. Eyal Press, Texaco on Trial, THE NATION, Mar. 31, 1999, at 11-12, available at http://www.
thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i= 19990531 &s=press (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
67. Immanuel Wallerstein, A Rising New Force in World Public Opinion, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE,
Jan. 28, 2004, at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id =3211 (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
68. See World Social Forum, at http://www.wsfindia.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
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tional governments,"69 it seems imperative that there be avenues of hope for the
populations with whom such activists are concerned.
The ATCA has been in its current state of active play for only a quarter cen-
tury. It is thus not hard to envision the world without it. In no way does this ar-
ticle suggest that the future of the human rights movement depends upon the
continued availability of the ATCA. However, it is certain that the more routes
available for addressing human rights violations committed against tradition-
ally under-protected people, the more likely they are to feel themselves a part of
their own communities and the global community as well. The ATCA is impor-
tant as one such avenue for those seeking a secure home for human rights claims.
It has gained renown as an important tool for increasing access to and participa-
tion in the judicial system. In this way, the U.S. federal courts have become in-
trinsically connected to alleviating a deficit in global judicial and civic pluralism.
C. The publicity drawn to the violations suffered by plaintiffis under the ATCA
alleviates a global information deficit. Such publicity leads to increased global cause-
centered involvement, or a diminution of the civic pluralism deficit.
Some commentators have asserted that "the principal benefit of the Alien
Tort suits for plaintiffs may be the publicity they can generate. '7' The use of
publicity to generate sympathy for human rights victims and ire against viola-
tors has been seen by human rights advocates as an essential part of their work.
The centrality of public awareness campaigns to the protection of human rights
has only continued to increase with time. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, among the two best-known and long-established nongovernmen-
tal organizations working on these issues, have persistently used the news media
as a crucial means to advance human rights and raise awareness of abuses in all
regions of the world.
In the United States, court cases, especially against the rich and powerful,
have long been newsworthy and a source of intrigue for the general population.
In this atmosphere, cases levied against especially the first and second type of
ATCA defendants described herein (foreign officials and transnational corpora-
69. See World Social Forum, Charter of Principles, at http://www.wsfindia.org/charter.php (last
visited Mar. 30, 2005).
70. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Alternative Justice: Facilitated by Little-Known 18th-
Century Law, CRIMES OF WAR MAGAZINE: THE TRIBUNALS, May 2001, at httpi/crimesofwar.org/
tribun-mag/magrelate alternative.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
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tions) have often drawn widespread media attention.7 The stories covering
these suits address the particular harms alleged by the plaintiffs, but they also
disclose the conditions under which the abuses took place. ATCA
lawsuits are likely to have more of a deterrent impact ... given
that the lawsuits receive more publicity in the defendants' home
countries, in part because the defendants in the civil suits tend to
be high level offenders and because the civil trials are open to the
public.
72
Social, labor, and environmental movements around the world have been
bolstered by the evidence disclosed in ATCA cases of human rights abuses by
corporate entities or corporate complicity in human rights abuses committed by
governments and/or private and public security forces acting on their behalf.
The astounding and still growing number of participants involved in the anti-
globalization demonstrations in Seattle, Washington, D.C., Brazil, and Mum-
bai, in part, has been educated about the human rights abuses attendant with
current forms of globalization through the publicity generated by court cases
brought against corporate defendants under the ATCA. The litigation against
foreign officials such as Ferdinand Marcos, the former Philippine president, Ra-
dovan Karadzic, the Bosnian-Serb leader, and others have also received wide-
spread media attention.
The significance of this media attention must not be underestimated. It is
one of the more powerful "original" and "informal" methods73 used in recent
years to try to influence decisionmaking in such a way that environmental, labor,
and human rights are more central to decisionmaking at all levels of political
life, including within the political and judicial branches of government. 74
71. See Brief for NFTC, supra note 26, at 4, 26-27.
72. Id. at 26-27.
73. This phrase is borrowed from the Presentation Statement of this conference. See Back to
Government? The Pluralistic Deficit in Decisionmaking Processes and Before the Courts, Presenta-
tion Statement (June 11, 2004), reprinted in Fulvio Cortese et al., Back to Government? The Plural-
istic Deficit in the Decisionmaking Processes and Before the Courts, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
409,410 (2005).
74. See Wallerstein,supra note 67.
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PART IV. THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
REQUIRES THE COURTS TO CONSIDER LEGAL PLURALISM
Litigation under the ATCA can make valuable contributions to alleviating
the pluralistic deficits present when human rights victims are not otherwise rec-
ognized, protected, or compensated. The battle, however, over whether it will be
able to serve this deficit relief function may ultimately depend on the Court's po-
sition on ideas of legal pluralism.
Legal pluralism theory has long engaged in identifying and analyzing situ-
ations in which more than one source contributes to the legal rules, norms, or
laws at play in a particular issue, society, or situation.75 Often the dialogue
around legal pluralism takes place in the context of legal anthropology or
through the elaboration by legal scholars of the common-law systems alive and
at work within countries that are in the process of developing a strong state, leg-
islative process, and judicial functions, 76 as they are keenly aware of the interplay
of ancient, common, or customary legal systems with the state power-based legal
regimes that are being created in a given location.
Much less common are clear articulations of the daily interplay of various
sources of rules, norms, and/or laws in long-established, state power-based legal
systems, which rely on the legal centrist belief that only the state has the power to
create and enforce law.77 This is not to say that such interplay is nonexistent, but
that it has not been commonly identified, labeled, and discussed in these terms.
Opponents of the ATCA asked the Court to rule that the Act is a jurisdictional
provision only and does not create causes of action. As described earlier in this
75. See generally, Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent De-
bate About Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 21 (1998) (briefly describing the emergence of
legal pluralism and its ongoing debates).
76. See generally Dolores A. Donovan & Getachew Assefa, Homicide in Ethiopia: Human Rights,
Federalism, and Legal Pluralism, 51 AM. J. CoMp. L. 505 (2003) (giving an anthropological descrip-
tion of the development of an Ethiopian government that incorporates a variety of ethic custom-
ary law systems while at the same time maintaining acceptable standards of protection for human
rights).
77. See generally Woodman, supra note 75. For the most part, this scholarship focuses on newly
emerging legal systems or those that are widely acknowledged as developing or in a state of flux.
See, e.g., MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, TOWARDS A TRULY COMMON LAW: EUROPE AS A LABORATORY FOR
LEGAL PLURALISM (Naomi Norberg trans., 2002) (1994) (describing European reconfiguration and
pluralism as crucial elements to developing a new common law system that is focused on the pri-
macy of human rights).
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paper, such a ruling would likely have rendered the Act useless for human rights
cases by limiting its application to situations that virtually do not exist-those in
which human rights victims are able to find and apply U.S. statutes or to find and
apply human rights treaties that the United States has ratified and made self-
executing such that they grant individuals private causes of action under them.
By using this process-grounded argument, the briefs supporting Sosa's case
argued vigorously that the only legitimate law for courts to consider under the
ATCA is specifically congressionally adopted law.7" In so doing, they attempted
to limit the substantive provisions of international law's human rights provi-
sions, whether derived from custom or treaty, from entering into the accepted
jurisprudence of the nation's highest court. They advance this argument despite
the uniformly hospitable treatment the lower courts have given human rights
provisions found in the law of nations or in the treaties to which the United
States is a signatory.79 If successful, this attempt to interpret the ATCA as noth-
ing more than a jurisdictional grant would have had the effect of limiting legal
pluralism by labeling customary international law as an illegitimate source of
law for federal courts to apply and restricting the sources to which they can le-
gitimately look to U.S. statutory law alone.
While deciding that the Act is a jurisdictional grant only, the Court also
stated that this jurisdictional grant permits federal courts to recognize a limited
set of customary international law norms.8" In other words, for at least a very
limited set of circumstances, courts need to consider the proper application and
content of customary international law in order to render decisions on ATCA
claims. The requirement that federal courts look to the international legal sys-
tem, and the mandate to do so, will require a strong understanding of the history
and process undertaken in other instances of legal pluralism.
CONCLUSION
In limited terms, the Sosa litigation before the Supreme Court challenged
"only the legal authority of low-level DEA agents to hire bounty hunters.. .to
abduct" a foreign national over the protests of his government.8 ' In deciding this
78. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, at
24-46.
79. Brief for the Respondent at 8, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339).
80. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2754 (2004).
81. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 79, at 6.
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case, the Court simultaneously navigated the issues of civic participation and
legal pluralism discussed herein.
This decision will have significant effects. First, opportunities for greater
civic engagement and pluralistic participation on behalf of some of the world's
least recognized and least included populations have been preserved, at least in
limited circumstances.
As previously explained, a decision to limit the ATCA would likely have
had the simultaneous effect of limiting the publicity received by the human
rights violations currently addressed by the ATCA. Widespread informed po-
litical participation on the part of people socially and geographically far removed
from the actual victims of abuses, but who may sympathize, organize, vote, or
otherwise engage in civic activities in an effort to ensure that human rights vic-
tims are provided with avenues to seek justice, depends upon the reporting of
human rights conditions and violations. When violations are widely publicized,
more people become aware of human rights and engage in their protection. This
is the case both within government and outside of it, whether through political
activism or more private means. Limiting publicity, therefore, diminishes politi-
cal participation among a greater population. The Court's decision in Sosa main-
tains the possibility of widespread publicity for violations that are brought to the
attention of U.S. courts under the ATCA.
A decision that the ATCA is a jurisdictional grant alone would have re-
moved one locale inhabited by legal pluralism since the 1980 Fildrtiga decision.
Litigation under the ATCA has created a space where federal courts actively en-
gage U.S. domestic law, the treaty law of the United States, and customary inter-
national law, as well as thejus cogens subset of customary international law. This
is by no means the only place where the U.S. courts have entertained interna-
tional law in making their decisions and it is certainly not the only space within
the U.S. judicial system where legal pluralism is at play. It is, however, a notable
location of legal pluralism because, if the Supreme Court is willing to accept the
challenges and complexities legal pluralism entails within the context of the
ATCA, the federal courts can make their contribution to one of the most wicked
of problems faced by international law: the enforceability of human rights.
What this means in practical terms is two-sided. While it certainly means that
individual plaintiffs under the ATCA can hope for redress, it also means that the
violators, whether they are government officials, multinational corporations, or
bounty hunters, are on notice that the human rights obligations agreed to by the
community of nations are real. It means human rights can be enforceable, and it
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means they must be respected together with domestic laws. If enforcement and
punishment are essential ingredients to deterring unwanted behavior, the ATCA
provides an opportunity for stemming future human rights violations.
Just as the effect of this enforcement is two-sided, so is what it means for in-
creased civic pluralism. On the one hand, it increases the civic engagement that
individual, traditionally unrepresented people have with government through
the litigation of these claims in U.S. federal courts. It also forces violators to en-
gage with the government by reeling them in and communicating that they are
not outside of, or beyond, the scope of the law. They are and will be engaged if
they violate human rights, regardless of where they commit the violations and
regardless of the nationality of their victims.
Allowing foreigners to access and use U.S. courts through the ATCA may
have the effect, in many instances, of providing a sort of representation on the in-
ternational plane that is all too often not afforded to individual victims of human
rights abuses. While this sort of ex post facto representation is preferred to no rep-
resentation at all, it is problematic. From the perspective of victims, it is much
more difficult to know of let alone use judicial resources that will provide them
adequate remedies if these paths are not clearly defined ahead of time. Also,
from the perspective of perpetrators, for example the corporate entities that have
actively lobbied against the ATCA and universal jurisdiction statutes, using the
courts as the location for participation and civic pluralism has the effect of creat-
ing instability and unpredictability that might not exist if there was early en-
gagement with the communities advancing the human rights interest. Early
engagement, at the rulemaking stage rather than the adjudicatory stage, might
lead to clear rules to which current or potential violators can adhere in order to
avoid litigation of this sort. The ATCA, seen in this way, is a last-ditch effort at
justice. Yet, such an effort is still worthwhile. It is precisely its character as a tool
of last resort that makes its continued viability imperative.
